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 ecent economic sanctions adopted by the United Nations, European 
Union, and the United States have focused on regulating commercial mari-
time activity to promote international security objectives. Targeting States 
for defying international norms, policymakers have restricted port access for 
designated vessels, banned certain cargo import and export, and authorized 
enhanced vessel inspections. Critically, these sanctions tactics have also in-
cluded prohibitions on marine insurance coverage for vessels and cargo 
linked to the targeted States.1 
The policy rationale driving the use of marine insurance prohibitions for 
sanctions purposes is that by limiting access to this integral source of risk 
management, designated actors find it more difficult to access maritime 
transport for malign purposes or to generate the trade revenue necessary to 
fulfill their strategic objectives. Such techniques have proved to be effective 
sources of economic coercion. At the same time, as these tactics have en-
hanced scrutiny over shipping activities, this has raised layers of challenges 
in the commercial maritime sphere, leaving marine insurers and others linked 
to the insurance industry scrambling to maintain compliance and hedge risk. 
Against this backdrop, this article explores the role of marine insurance 
prohibitions as an instrument of economic warfare. It first offers a brief his-
torical context, highlighting the political developments that led to their use 
as a geostrategic tool. It then examines recent marine insurance prohibitions 
employed in response to Iran and North Korea. Finally, it evaluates com-
mercial reactions to these restrictions as shipping industry participants have 
politically mobilized, enhanced compliance initiatives, and attempted to shift 
sanctions risk in their business dealings. 
 
II. BACKGROUND AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF TARGETED SANCTIONS 
 
Prohibitions on trading with the enemy have a long history that inherently 
intersects with commercial shipping. During the eighteenth century, English 
merchants were forbidden to trade or to correspond with their French coun-
terparts during times of hostilities.2 At least for a time, however, English 
                                                                                                                      
1. See infra Part III. 
2. For a more thorough historical account of insurance and warfare, see LUIS LOBO-
GUERRERO, INSURING WAR: SOVEREIGNTY, SECURITY, AND RISK (2012); Geoffrey Clark, 












insurers continued to underwrite marine insurance for French merchant ves-
sels and the cargo carried on them. English policymakers eventually recog-
nized England’s dominance in the marine insurance sector as a potentially 
powerful tool to further disrupt French commerce. Accordingly, in 1747, a 
bill was introduced in the English House of Commons to expressly prohibit 
English insurance covering French ships and cargo during wartime.3 
In the debate over the bill, some members of Parliament argued that 
insuring French ships was a form of “high treason” that enabled French 
merchants to “continue their trade and commerce.”4 These advocates for the 
ban submitted that without access to reliable insurance it would be too risky 
for French merchants with limited capital to engage in commercial maritime 
voyages, bringing “immediate distress upon the whole French commerce.”5 
Others in the House of Commons countered that English merchants re-
ceived major trade benefits by insuring French property.6 They raised con-
cerns that prohibiting insurance of French interests for political purposes 
could destroy an English competitive advantage in the marine insurance sec-
tor and set the stage for others in Europe, including the French, to develop 
their own insurance markets. Solicitor General William Murray, who later 
became known as the admired jurist Lord Mansfield, argued that the pro-
posed insurance ban was based on the assumption that the French would be 
unable to procure marine insurance elsewhere in Europe.7 He cautioned that 
such “ill-judged regulations, or mistaken politics” could cause England to 
lose “the only branch of trade we now enjoy without a rival” and perhaps 
even transfer it to the French.8 Despite these protests, the bill passed into 
                                                                                                                      
INSURANCE 247 (2004); MARTIN FREDERICK, THE HISTORY OF LLOYD’S AND OF MARINE 
INSURANCE IN GREAT BRITAIN: WITH APPENDIX CONTAINING STATISTICS RELATING TO 
MARINE INSURANCE (Franklin Classics 2018) (1876). 
3. WILLIAM CORBETT, THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND: FROM THE EAR-
LIEST TO THE YEAR 1803, at 108 (Nabu Press 2011) (1806). 
4. Id. at 111. 
5. Id. at 112. A further justification supporting the insurance prohibition was based on 
allegations of a “pernicious practice” that some English insurers had relayed intelligence to 
their French clients about the movements of English warships to help them avoid being 
captured as prizes of war. Id. 
6. Id. at 116. 
7. Id. at 118. 
8. Id. at 116. Attorney-General Dudley Ryder agreed, warning colorfully, “Like the dog 
in the fable, by snatching at the bone we fancy we see in the water, we shall lose that which 












law, serving as one of the early marine insurance prohibitions used explicitly 
for the purposes of economic warfare.9 
This link between economic warfare and marine insurance later extended 
to the other side of the Atlantic. After the outbreak of World War I, the 
United States intended to maintain neutrality, but by 1917, German U-boat 
attacks on U.S. merchant vessels caused it to abandon this approach. In the 
spring of 1917, President Woodrow Wilson urged Congress to declare war 
on Germany, famously remarking, “The present German submarine warfare 
against commerce is a warfare against mankind.”10 Congress followed suit, 
and only months after entering the war, President Wilson adopted a procla-
mation banning German insurance companies from providing marine insur-
ance to U.S.-flagged vessels.11 The rationale behind this prohibition was that 
the marine insurance business allows the insurer to gain knowledge into the 
movements of ships under its coverage and that “alien enemies” would relay 
this information to German U-boats.12 Accordingly, President Wilson an-
nounced, “German insurance companies now engaged in the transaction of 
business in the United States . . . are hereby prohibited from continuing the 
transaction of the business of marine and war risk insurance either as direct 
insurers or re-insurers.”13 
Congress responded with similar restrictions later that year, passing com-
prehensive economic sanctions legislation in the Trading with the Enemy 
Act of 1917.14 This legislation prohibited U.S. businesses to trade with any 
                                                                                                                      
9. Id. at 133. Legal historians have recently explained how licenses to trade with Eng-
land’s enemies proliferated in the Napoleonic era, giving ad hoc authorization to certain 
merchants. The widespread use of these licenses caused the formation of a black market for 
“simulated papers”—false documents designed to allow maritime traders to evade re-
strictions. Marine insurance policies adapted by authorizing maritime voyages executed un-
der these simulated papers. In fact, some insurers even refused to offer cover unless the 
assured merchants agreed to carry simulated papers on their vessels. See Su Jin Kim & James 
Oldham, Insuring Maritime Trade with the Enemy in the Napoleonic Era, 47 TEXAS INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW JOURNAL 561, 564 (2012). 
10. President Woodrow Wilson, Address to a Joint Session of the 65th Congress (Apr. 
2, 1917). 
11. Presidential Proclamation of July 13, 1917, 40 Stat. 1684 (1917). 
12. Id. 
13. Id. During both World War I and World War II, the United Kingdom instituted a 
form of sovereign guarantee under a war risk insurance scheme to support merchant ship-
ping and a steady food supply. See LOBO-GUERRERO, supra note 2, ch. 3. 
14. Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411 (codified and amended 












“enemy or ally of [an] enemy.”15 The Trading with the Enemy Act also in-
cluded a provision addressing insurance, stipulating that if “in the opinion 
of the President the public safety or public interest requires, the President 
may prohibit any or all foreign insurance companies from doing business in 
the United States.”16 The Trading with the Enemy Act has since been utilized 
expansively to justify economic sanctions during times of both war and peace 
and has also served as a model for other economic sanctions legislation.17 
At the conclusion of the two world wars, the international community 
took steps to avoid future hostilities by developing multilateral institutions, 
such as the United Nations. The UN Charter established a Security Council, 
which is granted authority to recommend and mandate economic sanctions 
in response to events that are a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or 
act of aggression.”18 Under this mandate, the Security Council has the option 
to implement measures, including “complete or partial interruption of eco-
nomic relations . . . and the severance of diplomatic relations.”19 One of the 
Security Council’s first uses of economic sanctions related to Southern Rho-
desia’s unilateral declaration of independence from the United Kingdom. 
Through a series of resolutions, the Council imposed a limited embargo 
against Southern Rhodesia, including measures designed to cut off its access 
to oil.20 British warships aimed to prevent vessels from delivering oil to a 
pipeline at Portuguese-controlled Beria along the coast of present-day 
Mozambique by patrolling the coasts and stopping a number of oil tankers.21 
But during the Cold War, multilateral sanctions were rare and difficult to 
execute. Political deadlock between the United States and the USSR—both 
permanent veto-wielding members of the Security Council—disrupted con-
                                                                                                                      
15. Id. § 3. 
16. Id. § 4. 
17. See Benjamin A. Coates, The Secret Life of Statutes: A Century of Trading with the Enemy 
Act, 1 MODERN AMERICAN HISTORY 151 (2018). 
18. U.N. Charter art. 39. 
19. Id. art. 41; see also M.D. Fink, Maritime Embargo Operations: Naval Implementation of UN 
Sanctions at Sea under Articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter, 60 NETHERLANDS INTERNATIONAL 
LAW REVIEW 73 (2013). 
20. See S.C. Res. 217 (Nov. 20, 1965); S.C. Res. 221 (Apr. 9, 1966). Oil embargos had 
also been proposed to impede tanker deliveries to South African ports in response to its 
apartheid policies. However, the Security Council never adopted these measures. See G.A. 
Res. 1761 (Nov. 6, 1962); see also EMBARGO: APARTHEID’S OIL SECRETS REVEALED (Rich-
ard Hengeveld & Jaap Rodenbur eds., 1995). 













sensus on sensitive security issues. This political impasse instead spurred uni-
lateral sanctions designed to promote the strategies of containment and de-
terrence. Perhaps most infamous among the sanctions was the U.S. trade 
embargo against Cuba that began after Fidel Castro’s communist revolution. 
Concerned that Cuba would serve as a USSR proxy based only ninety miles 
from the U.S. coastline, the United States pressured the Castro regime by 
instituting a comprehensive trade embargo.22 The embargo of Cuba was 
widely criticized around the world, including through annual resolutions in 
the U.N. General Assembly.23 
In fact, over time, general embargoes as a sanctions tactic were viewed 
as being overly broad and punitive towards ordinary populations with little 
influence on political elites. This skepticism towards embargoes intensified 
after the UN-backed blockade-like maritime interdiction operation against 
Iraq in 1990. In attempts to pressure the Saddam Hussein regime after it had 
invaded Kuwait, the Security Council prohibited inward and outward trade 
to Iraq and Kuwait.24 Enforced by the naval operation, the prohibitions over 
time contributed to food shortages in the region. This collateral impact con-
tributed to the development of “smart sanctions” designed to change the 
behavior of certain individuals and governmental organizations with a more 
targeted and less punitive effect.25 
The end of the Cold War fostered a more integrated sanctions policy 
approach. Under a string of treaties in the 1990s, including the Maastricht 
Treaty that formed the European Union, European States agreed to act as a 
bloc on certain defense and security measures. Among these measures was 
                                                                                                                      
22. Some trade restrictions between the United States and Cuba remain in force today. 
See generally JOSE R. COT & ROLANDO ANILLO, CUBA: A LEGAL GUIDE TO BUSINESS (2016). 
23. See, e.g., Press Release, General Assembly, Amid Demands for Ending Unilateral 
Coercive Measures, Speakers in General Assembly Urge United States to Repeal Embargo 
Against Cuba, U.N. Press Release GA/12085 (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.un.org/press/ 
en/2018/ga12085.doc.htm. 
24. S.C. Res. 661 (Aug. 6, 1990); S.C. Res. 665 (Aug. 25, 1990); see also KRASKA & PED-
ROZO, supra note 21, at 912–21. 
25. See Arne Tostensen & Beate Bull, Are Smart Sanctions Feasible?, 54 WORLD POLITICS 
373 (2002). But see Emma Ashford, Not-So-Smart Sanctions: The Failure of Western Restrictions 
Against Russia, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Jan.–Feb. 2016, at 114. Ashford argues that smart sanc-
tions continue to create unintended consequences that harm the general population of tar-
geted States, but largely do not affect political leaders and business elites that have already 
taken steps to mitigate or avoid the intended coercive effect of sanctions. Id. at 117. Thus, 
discussing the limited effect of U.S. sanctions imposed on Russia for its unlawful invasion 
of Crimea, she states, “At the same time that the sanctions have punished the population at 












the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, which 
granted EU agencies the authority to direct sanctions policy on a multilateral 
level.26 The UN Security Council also became more active during this period, 
utilizing increasingly targeted and sophisticated sanctions techniques. Multi-
lateral measures, including targeted restrictions on maritime assets, were em-
ployed in response to crises in Haiti, Yugoslavia, and Libya.27 
The 2001 al-Qaida attacks against the United States spawned a new era 
of sanctions in response to the threat of non-State actors.28 These tactics 
utilized financial services regulation, especially in the banking sector, to com-
bat terrorism financing and money laundering. Global financial infrastruc-
ture was subject to enhanced scrutiny to ensure designated individuals and 
businesses were denied access to the institutions necessary to support malign 
activities. Blacklisted entities were prevented from accessing critical financial 
tools, such as the Belgium-based Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial 
Telecommunication (SWIFT) messaging system.29 Since SWIFT holds an ef-
fective global monopoly as a trusted platform for banks to send and receive 
messages authorizing electronic transfers, this technique served as a particu-
larly powerful mechanism for sanctions enforcement. 
Subsequently, these sophisticated financial sanctions tactics were also 
implemented to address traditional security threats emanating from State ac-
tors.30 With the intent to drive a precise impact and raise the cost of defying 
international norms, these measures have targeted political leaders, State-
owned or State-operated businesses, and designated commercial transactions 
through sectoral sanctions.31 In the search for economic pressure points, pol-
icymakers have regulated transportation infrastructure, including naming 
                                                                                                                      
26. For a discussion of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, see Donato F. Na-
varrete & Rosa Maria F. Egea, The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union: A 
Historical Perspective, 7 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN LAW 41 (2001). 
27. KRASKA & PEDROZO, supra note 21, at 907–12. 
28. See generally RICHARD NEPHEW, THE ART OF SANCTIONS: A VIEW FROM THE FIELD 
(2018); JUAN ZARATE, TREASURY’S WAR: THE UNLEASHING OF A NEW ERA OF FINANCIAL 
WARFARE (2013). 
29. See ZARATE, supra note 28, at 269–85. 
30. See generally ROBERT D. BLACKWILL & JENNIFER M. HARRIS, WAR BY OTHER 
MEANS: GEOECONOMICS AND STATECRAFT (2016); see also Michael Peel & Jim Brunsden, 
Swift Shows Impact of Iran Dispute on International Business, FINANCIAL TIMES (June 5, 2018), 
https://www.ft.com/content/9f082a96-63f4-11e8-90c2-9563a0613e56; Henry Farrel, Rus-
sia is Hinting at a New Cold War Over SWIFT. So What’s SWIFT?, WASHINGTON POST (Jan. 
28, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/01/28/russia 
-is-hinting-at-a-new-cold-war-over-swift-so-whats-swift/. 












particular vessels and shipping companies on sanctions blacklists. Recent ap-
proaches combining the focus on both financial services and maritime assets 
harken back to the centuries-old technique of banning marine insurance cov-
erage over vessels and cargo with a nexus to sanctioned States. 
 
III. INSURANCE PROHIBITIONS AS A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY SANCTIONS 
TECHNIQUE 
 
There are a number of reasons why marine insurance prohibitions remain an 
effective tool to promote geostrategic outcomes. Insurance is a fundamental 
component of international business transactions effectuated by maritime 
infrastructure to spread the risk of maritime casualties and to maintain com-
pliance with various international rules and regulations. By restricting access 
to this vital source of risk management, targeted actors find it difficult to 
engage in nefarious maritime activity or legitimate revenue-producing trade. 
To fully understand this sweeping impact, it is first helpful to recall the 
basic structure of the marine insurance industry. While technological ad-
vances have improved navigation and maritime safety, ocean voyages remain 
risky business. Ship owners and other entities with an interest in the maritime 
voyage must procure insurance covering different parts of the risk. Conse-
quently, there are several distinct types of insurance relevant to commercial 
maritime voyages, including coverage for hull and machinery, cargo, protec-
tion and indemnity, and other risks. 
Hull and machinery coverage is designed to insure risks to the vessel 
itself. Modern commercial vessels are larger and more valuable than ever 
before—they can easily be worth tens of millions of dollars. These vessels 
are often mortgaged, and the entities that finance the purchase or construc-
tion of the vessels may require ship owners to maintain highly rated hull and 
machinery insurance covering the vessel and its equipment.32 Likewise, the 
cargo carried on these vessels is often highly valuable. Modern container 
vessels can move up to twenty thousand multimodal containers, bulk carriers 
may hold hundreds of thousands of tons of commodities, and supertankers 
may store up to two million barrels of oil.33 Such high-value cargo drives the 
                                                                                                                      
32. See Ivan Vella, Ship Management and Finance, in THE IMLI MANUAL ON INTERNA-
TIONAL MARITIME LAW: VOLUME II: SHIPPING LAW 105, 139 (Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Nor-
man Martinez, Ignacio Arroyo & Elda Belja eds., 2016). 
33. See Top 10 World’s Largest Container Ships in 2019, MARINE INSIGHT, https:// 
www.marineinsight.com/know-more/top-10-worlds-largest-container-ships-in-2019/ (last 












need for substantial cargo coverage and when the value is high enough, in-
surers may seek reinsurance to cover their own risks as well. 
Commercial maritime voyages also carry risks to third parties, including 
the possibility of collision, personal injury, marine pollution, and other open-
ended liabilities. Since these risks are indeterminate, historically, it was more 
difficult to find insurers willing to underwrite these special risks at a reason-
able premium. As for collision risk, underwriters at Lloyd’s were only willing 
to insure three-fourths of the risk, requiring the shipowner to cover the re-
maining one-fourth.34 This contributed to the development of ship-owner 
organizations known as protection and indemnity clubs (P&I clubs) where 
members annually contribute a “call” to a risk pool. Club members can then 
make withdrawals from the pool to cover liabilities in accordance with the 
P&I club rules. For risks excluded from P&I cover, other more specialized 
products are also available, such as war risk and trade disruption insurance. 
Modern marine insurance is more than a tool of risk management; un-
derlying contracts of carriage and regulations issued at the international, re-
gional, and domestic levels may require it. Charter party contracts made be-
tween ship owners and charterers regularly require the ship owner to main-
tain adequate insurance for the vessel.35 International treaties such as the In-
ternational Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage 
require ship owners to maintain liability insurance that will allow third parties 
injured by bunker oil maritime pollution to make claims directly against the 
insurer.36 Flag-State administrators, vessel safety classification societies, and 
port authorities may also impose insurance obligations on vessel operators. 
The vast majority of the marine insurance and reinsurance market is 
based in Western nations, much of it through the syndicates at Lloyd’s of 
London. This concentration creates limited access for marine insurance, 
which makes insurance prohibitions especially useful for economic sanctions 
purposes.37 Similar to the way that the SWIFT bank messaging system has 
been utilized to restrict designated individuals and banks from access to the 
global financial system, barring access to Lloyd’s of London and other 
                                                                                                                      
34. See generally STEVEN HAZELWOOD, P&I CLUBS: LAW AND PRACTICE (4d ed. 2010). 
35. See, e.g., New York Produce Exchange Time Charter 2015 cl. 6 (Oct. 15, 2015). 
36. International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage, 2001, 
Mar. 23, 2001. 
37. See Clare Baldwin & Osamu Tsukimori, Analysis: Marine Insurance: The Stranglehold on 













trusted insurance markets can have a similarly broad effect.38 Such bans may 
prevent targeted actors from procuring the insurance necessary to engage in 
maritime transport for malign purposes or to generate the revenue necessary 
for their illicit activities through legitimate trade. 
However, the transnational complexion of modern shipping practice 
creates unique challenges for insurance prohibitions as a sanctions tool. 
Commercial vessels are often flagged with open-registries—flags of conven-
ience—rather than with the nation with the closest nexus to the underlying 
shipping interests.39 This practice emerged in earnest in the second half of 
the twentieth century to avoid costs and oversight.40 Consequently, since a 
sanctioned State may benefit from trade conducted on foreign-flagged ves-
sels, a prohibition focusing only on that State’s domestically-flagged vessels 
may not provide the intended effect. Furthermore, shipping companies may 
utilize shell companies and business aliases, and may periodically re-register 
and re-name their enterprises to circumvent regulation.41 These evasive tac-
tics cause targeted insurance prohibitions for sanctions purposes to have 
short-lived impact unless policymakers regularly adapt and update them.42 
Despite these challenges, the international community has recently at-
tempted to utilize marine insurance prohibitions to address security concerns 




                                                                                                                      
38. See ZARATE, supra note 28, at 304–06; see generally supra Part II. 
39. For instance, the relatively small States of Panama, the Marshall Islands, and Liberia 
are currently the three most popular flag States in the world. See Top 10 Flag States 2018, 
LLOYD’S LIST: MARITIME INTELLIGENCE (Dec. 10, 2018), https://lloydslist.maritimeintel-
ligence.informa.com/LL1125024/Top-10-flag-states-2018. 
40. See H. Edwin Anderson, III, The Nationality of Ships and Flags of Convenience: Economics, 
Politics, and Alternatives, 21 TULANE MARITIME LAW JOURNAL 139 (1996). 
41. See Jo Becker, Web of Shell Companies Veils Trade by Iran’s Ships, NEW YORK TIMES 
(June 7, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/08/world/middleeast/08sanctions.ht 
ml; Anastassios Adamopoulos, IMO Confronts Fraudulent Vessel Registrations, LLOYD’S LIST: 
MARITIME INTELLIGENCE (Mar. 13, 2019), https://lloydslist.maritimeintelligence.in-
forma.com/LL1126602/IMO-confronts-fraudulent-vessel-registrations; Michelle Wiese 
Bockmann, Iran Oil Exports on the Rise as National Tanker Fleet Reflags, LLOYD’S LIST: MARI-
TIME INTELLIGENCE (Mar. 21, 2019), https://lloydslist.maritimeintelligence.informa.com/ 
LL1126731/Iran-oil-exports-on-the-rise-as-national-tanker-fleet-reflags. 
42. See generally BRYAN R. EARLY, BUSTED SANCTIONS: EXPLAINING WHY ECONOMIC 












A. Marine Insurance Prohibitions and Iran 
 
The first time the U.N. Security Council invoked an insurance prohibition 
for sanctions purposes was in response to Iran’s nuclear ambitions.43 These 
measures were in the works for many years.44 Even before its Islamic Revo-
lution, Iran pursued nuclear technology with some aid from Western nations. 
Relations soured in 1979 after Iranian protesters seized the U.S. embassy in 
Tehran. The United States classified Iran as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 
1984,45 and in the following decades, it imposed a series of sanctions against 
the country. Nevertheless, for much of this period, Iran continued trading 
with the rest of the world. In fact, as a founding member of the Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries, Iran has consistently been among the 
most prolific oil exporters in the world and a critical source of energy for 
European markets. 
The international concern over Iran’s nuclear aspirations increased in 
2002 when Iran publicly announced progress in building nuclear reactors. 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN agency responsi-
ble for nuclear nonproliferation, called for the suspension of nuclear enrich-
ment activities and inspections of Iran’s nuclear sites.46 However, Iran re-
fused to cooperate. After years of unsuccessful political engagement on the 
issue, in 2006 the IAEA referred the issue to the Security Council. 
In July 2006, Iran announced that for the first time, it had enriched ura-
nium. The Security Council responded with Resolution 1696, which called 
for Iran to suspend its enrichment activities.47 Diplomatic negotiations were 
held between Iran and the five permanent members of the Security Council 
(China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States), along with 
                                                                                                                      
43. See S.C. Res. 1929 (June 9, 2010); S.C. Res. 1803 (Mar. 3, 2008). Resolution 1803 
also references insurance when calling on States to “exercise vigilance in entering into new 
commitments for public provided financial support for trade with Iran, including the grant-
ing of export credits, guarantees or insurance, to their nationals of entities involved in such 
trade.” Id. ¶ 9. 
44. See generally Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy with Iran, ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION, 
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheet/Timeline-of-Nuclear-Diplomacy-With-Iran (up-
dated by Alicia Sanders-Zakre) (last visited Aug. 29, 2019). 
45. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM, https://www.sta 
te.gov/state-sponsors-of-terrorism/ (last visited Aug. 29, 2019). 
46. See IAEA and Iran: Chronology of Events, INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY ASSOCI-
ATION (IAEA), https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iran/chronology-of-key-events 
(last visited Aug. 29, 2019). 












Germany and EU representatives—known collectively as the P5+1. These 
negotiations did not resolve this issue, and the Security Council issued addi-
tional resolutions banning the transfer of nuclear technology to Iran, while 
freezing assets of individuals and businesses thought to be involved in Iran’s 
nuclear program.48 In 2009, Iran carried out provocative missile tests, which 
led to further condemnation. In response, in 2010, the Security Council is-
sued its most comprehensive sanctions against Iran in Resolution 1929.49 
Resolution 1929 banned the supply of enrichment-related technology to 
Iran and called on all States to inspect and seize vessels reasonably believed 
to be involved in these prohibited activities. The Resolution also limited the 
provision of vessel bunkering services and other fuel supplies to “Iranian-
owned or -contracted vessels, including chartered vessels” believed to be in-
volved in prohibited transactions.50 Further, the Resolution also called on 
States to “[p]revent the provision of financial services, including insurance 
or re-insurance” when there are “reasonable grounds to believe” these ser-
vices could contribute to Iran’s weapons programs.51 
The Security Council specifically designated the Iranian national carrier 
Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) and its affiliates as subject 
to these restrictions on marine insurance. As early as 2008, the United States 
and the United Kingdom had identified IRISL as a contributor to Iran’s nu-
clear programs and blacklisted its fleet of over one hundred vessels.52 A U.K. 
Treasury Order issued in 2009 banned all persons operating in the U.K. fi-
nancial sector from transacting any business with IRISL.53 This effectively 
                                                                                                                      
48. S.C. Res. 1737 (Dec. 23, 2006); S.C. Res. 1747 (Mar. 24, 2007); S.C. Res. 1803 (Mar. 
3, 2008). 
49. S.C. Res. 1929 (June 9, 2010). 
50. Id. ¶ 18. 
51. Id. 
52. See Press Release, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Major Iranian Shipping Com-
pany Designated for Proliferation Activity (Sept. 10, 2008), https://www.treasury.gov/ 
press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1130.aspx; see also ZARATE, supra note 28, at 304–06. 
Going beyond what the Security Council has required, the U.S. sanctions on Iran have been 
particularly broad and sweeping. These sanctions include a number of legislative measures, 
including the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions and Account-
ability and Divestment Act of 2010, the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 
2012, the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, as well as various 
executive orders and others regulations. 
53. See The Financial Restrictions (Iran) Order 2009, SI 2009/2725, art. 3, ¶ 1(b) (Eng.). 
The United States undertook similar efforts and also designated front companies and indi-
viduals attempting to help the IRISL bypass these financial restrictions. See Treasury Exposes 












barred IRISL’s access to Lloyd’s of London and the U.K.-based members of 
the International Group of P&I Clubs, which had a considerable impact on 
IRISL’s ability to maintain adequate insurance and engage in maritime trade. 
During this period, the European Union issued its own sanctions against 
Iran. These measures also designated IRISL entities and affiliates as subject 
to sanctions, including the National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC).54 By 
2012, the European Union enhanced these measures to ban all oil and pet-
rochemical imports from Iran.55 Among these measures were provisions 
prohibiting insurance coverage for tankers carrying such cargos. Article 11 
of EU Council Regulation 267/2012 states, “It shall be prohibited . . . to 
provide, directly or indirectly, financing or financial assistance, including fi-
nancial derivatives, as well as insurance and re-insurance related to the im-
port, purchase or transport of crude oil and petroleum products of Iranian 
origin or that have been imported from Iran.”56 Article 35 of the same regu-
lation goes further by banning the provision of insurance to “Iran or its Gov-
ernment, and its public bodies, corporations and agencies.”57 
Taken together, these sanctions generated a considerable negative im-
pact on Iran’s economy.58 Between 2011 and 2013, Iran’s oil exports 
dropped, and the value of the Iranian rial fell substantially.59 In turn, this 
economic pressure allowed for leveraged diplomatic negotiations between 
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Iran and the P5+1.60 Through these negotiations, Iran eventually agreed to 
submit to international inspections of its nuclear program in exchange for 
sanctions relief. This agreement was memorialized in the 2015 Joint Com-
prehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).61 The JCPOA required Iran to cease 
uranium enrichment activities, dismantle and store nuclear equipment, and 
allow scheduled monitoring and verification by the IAEA. In return, the UN 
and EU sanctions targeting Iran’s nuclear program would be terminated. The 
United States also agreed to roll back the sanctions it had imposed based on 
the nuclear program and agreed to grant a general license for foreign entities 
to engage in commercial activity with Iran.62 However, the United States 
continued to restrict U.S. businesses from engaging with Iran on commercial 
matters based on independent foreign policy grounds, including Iran’s State 
Support of Terrorism designation, its destabilizing influence in the Middle 
East, and widespread human rights abuses.63 
The Security Council endorsed the JCPOA in Resolution 2231.64 Subse-
quently, the IAEA issued reports verifying Iran’s compliance with the 
JCPOA.65 As agreed, the United Nations and the European Union lifted the 
nuclear-related sanctions.66 Under the Obama administration, the United 
States issued waivers and licenses that included a number of P&I clubs and 
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other marine insurers.67 Businesses in various sectors, including the maritime 
industry, expressed optimism about the opportunity to enter the Iran market. 
Major European shipping companies announced they would begin limited 
service to Iran, while also remaining cautious of the fragile geopolitical situ-
ation.68 Previously blacklisted national Iranian carriers, including IRISL, be-
gan limited trading to European ports.69 Marine insurance companies again 
expressed interest in providing coverage to vessels with an Iranian nexus.70 
The November 2016 election of Donald Trump as president of the 
United States quickly altered this sense of optimism because he had harshly 
criticized the JCPOA during his election campaign.71 During his first eight-
een months in office, President Trump continued to grant waivers as the 
Obama administration had done, although he repeatedly threatened to with-
draw from the JCPOA.72 In May 2018, President Trump finally announced 
that the United States would end its participation in the JCPOA.73 Shortly 
after this announcement, the U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of 
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued guidance explaining that there would 
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be a limited wind-down period before sanctions snap-back. The guidance 
included a deadline of November 5, 2018 for the provision of underwriting 
services, insurance, and reinsurance.74 
Attempting to preserve the JCPOA, the European Union implemented 
countermeasures designed to limit the extraterritorial impact of the U.S. 
sanctions.75 The European Commission updated a decades-old “Blocking 
Regulation” designed to prevent European businesses from complying with 
enumerated U.S. sanctions.76 France, Germany, and the United Kingdom 
also worked with Iran to establish a “special purpose vehicle” designed to 
facilitate transactions bypassing the U.S. banking system through a kind of 
bartering system called the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (IN-
STEX).77 The disharmony between U.S. sanctions and European counter-
measures introduced considerable uncertainty into the maritime industry, 
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B. Marine Insurance Prohibitions and North Korea 
 
Similar insurance prohibitions have been used against North Korea. As with 
Iran, the historical background leading up to these sanctions is complex.79 
After the Korean War’s active hostilities concluded with an armistice in 1953, 
the Korean peninsula remained divided in two halves with a demilitarized 
zone along the 38th parallel separating the Soviet-backed North from the 
U.S.-backed South.80 While the two sides technically remain at war because 
a peace treaty has never been agreed upon, there has been relative peace 
during the post-war period.81 Since the 1953 armistice, South Korea has 
thrived economically and become one of the most prosperous nations in the 
region.82 In contrast, North Korea has remained politically isolated and un-
derdeveloped, with limited trade integration with the rest of the world.83 
During the 1990s, North Korea began to enrich plutonium in apparent 
pursuit of nuclear weapons. The Security Council threatened sanctions until 
North Korea agreed to IAEA inspections. North Korea did not fully coop-
erate with the inspections and withdrew from the IAEA in 1994.84 Following 
the death of North Korea’s founder Kim Il Sung, his son Kim Jong Il be-
came the supreme leader in 1994. Under his leadership, North Korea regu-
larly engaged in provocative weapons testing. In 2002, U.S. President George 
W. Bush famously branded North Korea part of an “axis of evil” and drew 
attention to its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.85 By 2003, North 
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Korea had announced it was withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonprolifera-
tion Treaty (NPT).86 In response, the United States imposed unilateral sanc-
tions on North Korean companies and individuals.87 
Following the North Korean announcement and the imposition of U.S. 
sanctions, the “Six-Party Talks” consisting of North Korea, South Korea, 
Japan, the United States, China, and Russia attempted to find a peaceful res-
olution to this issue.88 In 2005, North Korea agreed to abandon its nuclear 
program and committed to returning to the IAEA and NPT, but quickly 
changed course and engaged in a series of missile tests, again drawing inter-
national condemnation. These tests initiated a string of Security Council res-
olutions between 2006 and 2009, leading to an arms embargo and financial 
sanctions on entities suspected of participating in weapons development.89 
Following the death of Kim Jong Il, his son Kim Jong Un assumed 
power in 2011. Under Kim Jong Un’s leadership, North Korea continued 
missile tests between 2012 and 2015.90 In response, the Security Council and 
the United States sought to increase sanctions pressure by targeting individ-
uals, financial institutions, and shipping companies believed to be supporting 
these illicit activities. Under Resolution 2094 (2013), the Security Council 
mandated that “Member States shall not provide public financial support for 
trade with the DPRK [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] (including 
granting of export credits, guarantees, or insurance to their national or enti-
ties involved in such trade)” if the support would contribute to North Ko-
rea’s weapons programs.91 
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In 2016, North Korea announced that it had tested a hydrogen bomb 
for the first time.92 The Security Council responded with Resolution 2270, 
which further enhanced sanctions by requiring Member States to inspect 
vessels transiting to and from North Korea.93 Borrowing the insurance ban 
tactic used against Iran in 2010, Resolution 2270 requires Member States to 
 
[p]rohibit their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and entities 
incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction from register-
ing vessels in the DPRK, obtaining authorization for a vessel to use the 
DPRK flag, and from owning, leasing, operating, providing any vessel clas-
sification, certification or associated service, or insuring any vessel flagged 
by the DPRK.94 
 
Subsequently, Resolution 2321 clarified that Member States are also required 
to prohibit “insurance or re-insurance services to vessels owned, controlled, 
or operated, including through illicit means, by the DPRK.”95 This extended 
the previous prohibition on banning insurance only to North Korean-
flagged vessels. 
In 2017, the United States and South Korea deployed a Terminal High-
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system designed to intercept North Ko-
rean missiles.96 That year, North Korea engaged in some of its most bellig-
erent behavior, including firing an intercontinental ballistic missile that was 
capable of reaching the U.S. mainland over Japan.97 This provocation led to 
an ominous public exchange between Kim Jong Un and President Trump. 
Chairman Kim threatened to attack Guam, and President Trump remarked 
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to the UN General Assembly that the United States could be forced to “to-
tally destroy North Korea.”98 
The Security Council then passed Resolution 2371, which banned a va-
riety of North Korean exports, including coal, iron, and seafood.99 After ad-
ditional missile tests, the Security Council passed Resolutions 2375 and 2397, 
which banned North Korea from importing steel and aluminum and placed 
quotas on imports of oil, natural gas, and other fuel.100 Resolution 2397 also 
expanded the scope of the insurance ban through the following provision:  
 
Each Member State shall prohibit its nationals, persons subject to its juris-
diction and entities incorporated in its territory or subject to its jurisdiction 
from providing insurance or re-insurance services to vessels it has reason-
able grounds to believe were involved in activities, or the transport of items 
prohibited by [previous Security Council resolutions].101 
 
The United States, the European Union, and other jurisdictions imple-
mented these resolutions, sometimes going beyond what was mandated by 
the Security Council. For instance, U.S. Executive Order 13,810 mandates 
that no vessel that has visited North Korea or engaged in a ship-to-ship 
transfer designed to circumvent sanctions may call at a port in the United 
States within the following 180 days.102 
Despite the intensity of this political rhetoric and the broad scope of 
these security measures, tempers eventually cooled, and President Trump 
and Chairman Kim met at a summit in Singapore in June 2018.103 At the end 
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of the summit, they issued a joint statement agreeing to pursue complete 
denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.104 Both sides heralded the summit 
as a success, with President Trump publicly claiming that North Korea was 
“no longer a nuclear threat.”105 Following the Singapore summit, North Ko-
rea refrained from weapons testing through the end of 2018. President 
Trump and Chairman Kim met again in Hanoi in 2019, but the talks col-
lapsed when the United States would not agree to discuss the immediate 
suspension of sanctions until North Korea took further steps to verify it was 
irreversibly abandoning its nuclear weapons.106 Subsequently, although 
North Korea resumed its missile testing, in a historic moment President 
Trump and Chairman Kim met briefly along the DMZ, and President Trump 
even briefly set foot in North Korean territory.107 However, this meeting did 
not put an end to North Korea’s renewed missile testing.108 
 
IV. CONTEMPORARY COMMERCIAL RESPONSES TO INSURANCE               
PROHIBITIONS 
 
The substantial financial impact for commercial actors directly targeted by 
marine insurance prohibitions and sanctions blacklists is readily apparent. 
These vessels and shipping companies have only a few options to access the 
insurance that is necessary to engage in maritime trade. They must either 
replace coverage through domestic providers or sovereign guarantees or oth-
erwise self-insure against all marine risks. In the case of Iran during the 
height of the multilateral sanctions against IRISL, NITC, and their affiliates, 
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Iranian vessels attempted to acquire coverage through Iran’s national gov-
ernment and domestic insurers.109 This included accessing coverage through 
entities such as the Iran-based Kish P&I Club, which is not a member of the 
London-based International Group of P&I Clubs.110 
Several industry analysts have expressed skepticism that these alternative 
sources of insurance would be adequate in the case of a major marine casu-
alty.111 Some analysts have raised concerns that banning insurance for vessels 
carrying large amounts of oil as cargo and fuel places too much risk on the 
marine environment.112 This view contends that it is unclear whether a sov-
ereign liability fund, particularly those administered by a cash-strapped Iran, 
would be able to pay out claims in the case of a large oil spill. Observers have 
also underscored that limiting P&I access may place seafarers or other third 
parties at greater risk of being unable to recover for injuries suffered while 
performing work on vessels.113 Even if a domestic insurer or sovereign guar-
antee could offer adequate assurance for such liabilities, it is unclear how 
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these claims would be paid given the restrictions on access to the global fi-
nancial infrastructure.114 
Some have also responded to the use of marine insurance prohibitions 
as geopolitical tools with frustration.115 One Lloyd’s List editorial even de-
scribed the lost revenue due to the Iran sanctions as “a disguised form of 
expropriation.”116 Such reactions echo the free-trade voices opposing insur-
ance bans in the eighteenth century.117 Insurers have also lamented that the 
prohibitions disproportionately target the insurance industry in contrast to 
the more narrow import and export restrictions affecting other sectors.118 
They note that these broad prohibitions unfairly utilize insurance providers’ 
compliance initiatives to police the sanctions, while also driving a market for 
less secure insurance arrangements that are more likely to put third parties at 
risk.119 They argue that targeted actors will continue to trade regardless of the 
sanctions, albeit with less reputable insurance, thereby placing the compli-
ance burden on port States to examine any unorthodox insurance coverage 
on vessels attempting to enter their ports.120 
Amidst all of this controversy, insurers have responded to the risks of 
harsh sanctions penalties by enhancing compliance initiatives.121 This “know 
your customer” approach has become an entrenched aspect of commercial 
practice in the banking and finance sectors in recent decades, but it is less 
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familiar in the marine insurance market.122 Scholars and industry observers 
have recently pointed out how sanction compliance in the maritime sector 
can affect ancillary services, not only for insurers, but also for entities such 
as freight forwarders, logistics providers, shipbrokers, and bunker service 
companies.123 Sanctions may require these entities to engage in more thor-
ough vessel vetting, cargo checking, Automatic Identification System (AIS) 
data tracking, and other due diligence safeguards to ensure their customers 
are not disguising illicit transactions as legitimate trade. 
Since sanctions evolve rapidly in response to pressing geopolitical devel-
opments, compliance questions are often left unanswered. For instance, after 
the EU oil embargo was placed on Iran in 2012, it was not immediately clear 
whether the ban included bunker oil along with cargo oil.124 These uncertain-
ties can result in overcompliance with sanctions reaching further and lasting 
longer than policymakers intend.125 Overcompliance can also create a chilling 
effect, where financial entities simply chose not to do business in challenging 
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environments because the risk of sanctions violations outweighs the com-
mercial reward. Such decisions create negative consequences for citizens liv-
ing in targeted states, while also frustrating humanitarian and development 
efforts.126 Commercially, even those insurers covering authorized cargo have 
questioned whether they could legally pay out claims if a marine casualty 
occurred off the coasts of a sanctioned State.127 In addition, although import 
and export restrictions generally omit food and medicine, some analysts ar-
gue that broad insurance bans resulting in overcompliance could make it 
more difficult to provide these goods.128 
To address the risk of a customer becoming subject to sanctions during 
an insurance policy period, insurers have begun updating insurance contracts 
with “sanctions clauses.”129 Designed to exclude coverage of prohibited 
transactions, these clauses provide a right of early termination in the case of 
sanctions risk. Several model clauses have been promulgated by industry or-
ganizations, including the Lloyd’s Market Association, which published a 
model clause for hull and machinery policies called the LMA 3100 clause.130 
This clause allows the insurer or reinsurer to avoid liability to pay claims 
under the policy if it “would expose” the insurer to “any sanction, prohibi-
tion or restriction under United Nations resolutions or the trade or economic 
sanctions, laws or regulations of the European Union, United Kingdom or 
United States of America.”131 Similar clauses have been recommended for 
cargo policies, and various P&I clubs have updated their rules to include 
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similar language.132 These sanctions clauses mirror those that have been in-
cluded in recent updates to other contracts used in international commercial 
transactions, including charter parties, bills of lading, and letters of credit.133 
English courts have recently ruled on cases addressing sanctions risk and 
marine insurance in the Iran context. Among the issues raised by these cases 
is whether an insurer has the right to terminate an insurance policy during a 
policy period on the grounds of illegality and frustration after an insurance 
prohibition is announced.134 Cases have also addressed the efficacy of vari-
ous sanctions clauses, including the LMA 3100 clause, in providing the in-
surer with the right to terminate coverage after an assessment of sanctions 
risk.135 The results have varied depending on the language of the sanctions 
clause, which has proved instructive in identifying the suitable language for 
insurers to include in their insurance policies.136 
The present sanctions disharmony between the United States and the 
European Union on the Iran issue has also caused commercial contro-
versy.137 The United States continues to ban insurance coverage and other 
material support for transactions with an Iran nexus and has threatened sanc-
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tions enforcement against international insurers and financial service provid-
ers.138 Simultaneously, the European Union has attempted to preserve the 
JCPOA through countermeasures such as its Blocking Regulation. These di-
vergent legal approaches have led to uncertainty in the insurance sector over 
whether coverage is permitted or prohibited.139 Compounding the challenges 
raised by this inconsistency is the fact that the electronic platform used in 
Lloyd’s of London is partly owned by a U.S. firm.140 Although the United 
Kingdom and the rest of the European Union have rolled back sanctions on 
Iran and permitted insurers to cover Iranian vessels and cargo under the 
JCPOA framework, the integration of the Lloyd’s market infrastructure into 
the U.S. financial and technology sectors has left insurers second-guessing 
compliance.141 At present, it is unclear whether other countermeasures, such 
as the INSTEX trading mechanism, or other creative solutions, like the use 
of cryptocurrencies, will provide a way around the U.S. sanctions.142 
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Meanwhile, in the North Korea context, there is still a long way to go 
before a rollback in sanctions becomes a realistic possibility. Concurrent with 
diplomatic efforts such as the Hanoi summit and the Trump-Kim meeting 
in the DMZ, U.S. sanctions have continued to target shipping companies 
and vessels thought to be involved in North Korea sanctions busting activ-
ity.143 In an unprecedented move, the United States even impounded one of 
North Korea’s largest bulk carriers for engaging in illegal coal trades.144 
The focus on marine insurance as a sanctions tool has also continued. 
Concurring with recommendations made by a U.N. Panel of Experts Report, 
recent U.S. OFAC guidance urged P&I clubs to guard against unwittingly 
violating sanctions by utilizing “AIS-switch off clauses” in insurance pack-
ages for “at-risk” vessels.145 These clauses are designed to offer the insurer 
grounds to cancel participation in insurance if a vessel operator deactivates 
its AIS tracking system—a technique that has been described as a “deceptive 
maritime practice”—to circumvent sanctions through ship-to-ship transfers 
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on the high seas.146 Nevertheless, as high-level diplomatic engagement con-
tinues, sanctions may be reduced incrementally if North Korea takes verifi-
able steps to abandon its nuclear weapons program. As this process unfolds, 
insurers, along with other maritime businesses, will be ready to evaluate the 
North Korean market. Learning from the recent Iran experience, they will 




The peaceful resolution of international disputes often requires innovative 
approaches. At present, targeted economic sanctions are used as the primary 
method of enhancing political pressure without the use of conventional mil-
itary intervention. International policymakers must examine the nuances of 
the global economy and select precise pressure points to develop sanctions 
techniques that effectively transmit the intended coercive force. In recent 
years, targeted insurance prohibitions have emerged for this purpose with 
some level of success. When new security challenges arise, such tactics may 
serve as a model for future policy responses.148 In considering these 
measures, policymakers must remain cognizant of their substantial impact 
on marine insurers and the broader shipping community. Even so, the in-
dustry players most directly affected by marine insurance prohibitions will 
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likely agree that while these measures may reduce profits, create compliance 
challenges, and place third parties at risk, they are still less commercially dis-
ruptive—and certainly less ethically distressing—than the outbreak of war. 
 
